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The World Bank withholds loan disbursements in order to build a reputation for enforcing conditionality, and multi-
national firms lobby for these funds to be released. Using data drawn from World Bank reports, we find evidence that
(1) participation by Fortune 500 multinational corporations as project contractors and (2) investments by these firms are
associated with disbursements that are unjustified by project performance. In addition, these measures of corporate
interest are associated with inflated project evaluations. These effects are limited to multinational corporations head-
quartered in the United States or Japan, suggesting that the influence of private actors depends on access to particular
national policy networks. In contrast to the evidence of corporate influence, we find no consistent evidence of geopolitical
influences.
Multinational corporations (MNCs) profit fromWorldBank lending by serving as contractors and by en-joying the downstream benefits of development proj-
ects. Their interests diverge from those of the Bank, however,
because the Bank is responsible for diverse mandates, such as
environmental protection; it seeks to defend a global reputa-
tion, while firms are interested in the outcomes of individual
projects. The Bank enforces conditionality by withholding fund-
ing from projects that come up short. Well-connected multi-
national firms, on the other hand, lobby to release these funds,
which undermines the Bank’s efforts to maintain project qual-
ity and pursue environmental and human rights mandates.
This lobbying is effective because the World Bank is subject
to substantial US and Japanese informal influence, democratic
governments are responsive to corporate interests, andWorld
Bank officials have professional incentives to exaggerate proj-
ect performance.
Our conclusions may seem puzzling to readers familiar
with contemporary models of foreign direct investment. For-
eign investment is an attractive strategy for high-productivity
firms, which can afford the fixed costs of locating abroad, and
which have intangible assets to protect, and therefore prefer to
invest rather than contract at arm’s length (Helpman, Melitz,
and Yeaple 2004). From this perspective, MNCs should be
valuable partners for the Bank because the firms that engage
in foreign direct investment (FDI) have technology, organi-
zational skills, and other intangible assets that give them high
productivity. Here, MNCs are allies in economic develop-
ment: they should promote project performance and should
not be particularly tempted to collude with governments or
lobby on behalf of governments that fail to perform, because
their interests are aligned with the Bank’s.
The missing factor in this argument is firms’ political ac-
tivity. A large multinational firm is a potent political actor
both in the host country, where it invests, and in the home
country, where it has its headquarters. When it makes a for-
eign investment, it anticipates the political power that it will
wield as a high-capacity organization with specific assets at
risk. In some cases, these investments only make sense be-
cause of the opportunity to obtain rents, either through mar-
ket imperfections or political activity. Firms investing with
these motives are unlikely to be allies of the World Bank, and
their investments may be predicated on the ability to sub-
vert the Bank’s intentions. This political economy perspec-
tive would not expect MNCs to improve project performance
but would expect them to collude with Bank staff on project
evaluation and lobby for disbursements of financing that may
improve their own bottom lines.
From this perspective, the politics of implementing con-
ditionality should be quite different in the World Bank than
in its sister institution, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF).
The Bank is more attractive as a political target for multi-
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national firms, and the Fund is more attractive to powerful
states. Individual IMF decisions can rescue or topple member
governments, so states have strong incentives tomaintain close
control over decision making (Stone 2011). In contrast, while
aggregate Bank lending is substantial, the implementation of
most Bank projects involves lower political stakes, so the cost
of devolving control over implementation to private agents is
lower. From the perspective of firms, interests in IMF pro-
grams are diffuse and rarely tangible enough to justify political
activity. In contrast, firms have interests in particular World
Bank projects.
New project-level data that are more comprehensive and
detailed than were previously available allow us to investi-
gate the politics of project evaluation and implementation.
We have coded all Implementation Completion and Results
(ICR) reports for projects from 1994 to 2013 for project eval-
uations, sectoral composition, objectives, and implementation.
We combine these data with firm-level data on participation
in projects as contractors from the World Bank’s records and
on foreign mergers and acquisitions from Securities Data Com-
pany (SDC) Platinum. We find no evidence that MNC in-
volvement as contractors improves the performance of Bank
projects. However, we do find that participation by Fortune
Global 500 multinational corporations as contractors is as-
sociated with increases in disbursement rates that are not jus-
tified by project performance, and with inflated project eval-
uations. We interpret this as evidence of corporate lobbying
for disbursements and collusion by Bank staff to influence
evaluation. This interpretation is corroborated by further tests
that zero in on the mechanism of influence. The effect of con-
tractors is strengthened when we focus on those with man-
agement functions, which have the strongest incentives to
lobby. Furthermore, disaggregating contractors by country of
origin shows that the results are driven by firms headquar-
tered in the United States and Japan, which have access to the
most influential policy networks. The implications of these
results are expanded by further tests using an alternative mea-
sure, investments by these MNCs. While the contracts data
provide clean identification of lobbying motives, the invest-
ment data suggest that the range of firms involved in political
activity is broader than the set of contractors. In contrast, we
do not find evidence of patterns of informal influence at the
project level consistent with the kind of geopolitical motives
that have been found in studies of the IMF and the Bank that
have focused on country-level outcomes.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PROJECT EVALUATION
Three chains of delegation provide access points for MNCs
that seek to influence the World Bank. First, the internal del-
egation chain from the Bank to its staff is based on its staff
evaluation system. The criteria used to evaluate projects affect
lending policy because project evaluations affect the personnel
evaluations of project managers. Second, the Bank is an agent
of its member states, which exert formal control through their
executive directors and informal control through pressure on
the Bank’s management. The United States is the key prin-
cipal. Among the other leading states, Japan has historically
played a much stronger role in the Bank than in the IMF. A
third chain of delegation lies within the governance structures
of the major member states, which are democracies and there-
fore accessible to determined interest groups. The most sig-
nificant changes in Bank policy began as lobbying campaigns
by interest groups and NGOs, which almost always focused
their efforts on mobilizing support in the US Congress. Sim-
ilarly, exceptions to Bank policies, which are of more interest
to particular MNCs than the general contours of policy, fre-
quently originate in efforts to lobby the US government.
States use project evaluation criteria to control the World
Bank, and nongovernmental actors seek to reform the criteria
to influence the Bank’s behavior. The Bank has been the target
of several effective campaigns by NGOs to reform its policies
(see Keck and Sikkink 1998).1 In each case, the mechanism
of influence appeared to flow through national governments.
For example, the World Bank adopted an environmental man-
date under theMcNamara presidency butmade little progress
formany years in improving environmental outcomes because
no environmental criteria were included in project evalua-
tions. Environmental interest groups publicized this failure in
the 1980s and successfully lobbied for far-reaching changes in
the Bank’s policies for monitoring the environmental impact
of its projects. The turning point appears to have been the
successful effort to lobby the US government, which in turn
used its position on the Executive Board and its informal in-
fluence with the management of the Bank to promote reform
(Nielson and Tierney 2003).
An illustration of the importance of project evaluations to
the careers of project managers, or task team leaders (TTLs),
is that the Bank finds it difficult to find qualified staff who are
willing to work in countries where project outcomes are un-
likely to be favorable (Independent Evaluation Group 2006,
54). The World Bank Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)
report, “Engaging with Fragile States,” argued that country di-
rectors tended to neglect fragile states, where evaluation out-
comes were not expected to be impressive, and concentrated
their efforts on countries that appeared to be more promising.
1. Campaigns have led to changes in the Bank’s operational manual
covering involuntary resettlement (1980), indigenous peoples (1982), poverty
reduction (1993), and gender issues (1994); each of these criteria has been
incorporated into the process of project evaluation (Clegg 2013, 110).
104 / Corporate Influence in World Bank Lending Rabia Malik and Randall W. Stone
In its response to the evaluation, Bank management con-
curred with the IEG diagnosis, specifically repeating the point
that incentives created by the process of staff evaluation made
it difficult for the Bank to respond adequately to crises in fragile
states (Independent Evaluation Group 2006, 57).
The sensitivity of project evaluations generates an incen-
tive to present project outcomes in the most positive light,
but this incentive is balanced by the IEG, which audits every
project’s implementation and completion report (ICR).2 The
ICRs are self-assessments prepared by the TTLs and their
staff, and the IEG evaluation disagrees with the ICR in ap-
proximately 20% of the cases and generally downgrades the
evaluation when it disagrees. In addition, it rates 10%–15%
of ICRs as “unsatisfactory.”3 A standard IEG review is a desk
review based on the project documents and the ICR; in about
one-third of the projects, the IEG also performs a Project Per-
formance Assessment Report (PPAR), which is a more de-
tailed evaluation that involves sending IEG personnel into the
field to investigate outcomes.4 The ever-present incentive to
shade the truth in a favorable direction when preparing the
ICR is balanced by the risk of receiving a downgrade or an
unsatisfactory rating for the ICR, which is professionally em-
barrassing and could influence staff performance evaluations.
The seriousness with which IEG evaluations are taken is in-
dicated by the vigorous defense mounted by staff whose proj-
ects receive negative assessments, particularly when there is a
“disconnect” between the ICR evaluation and the IEG evalu-
ation.5
MNCs are generally uninterested in influencing the broad
patterns of Bank policy but may be intensely interested in
particular exceptions to these policies that affect their own
profits. This can occur for two reasons. First, the majority
of World Bank projects are performed in part or in whole by
firms working on contracts, and many of these are affiliates
of major MNCs. In these cases, the parent firm has a finan-
cial interest in seeing that the affiliate is paid for its services,
and disbursement of funds may be delayed or canceled if
the project is unsuccessful. All else equal, the TTL shares the
firm’s preference for full disbursement because this contrib-
utes to the overall outcome rating, but conditional on the
project not fully achieving its objectives, the TTL can limit
the damage by reducing disbursement.6 To the extent that
multinational firms are able to effectively pressure the Bank
to fully disburse the loans from which their affiliates benefit,
this creates an additional incentive for project managers to
exaggerate the extent to which project objectives were ful-
filled in order to justify high disbursement rates.
Second, a firm may have an incentive to lobby for full dis-
bursement even if it is not a direct recipient of project funds,
because it does not internalize the benefits of the Bank’s
strategy of maintaining a reputation for enforcing condition-
ality. Suspending disbursement is the Bank’s primary tool to
incentivize governments to fulfill their obligations, but sus-
pending funding for a particular project generally makes prog-
ress less likely rather than more, since World Bank financing
may be critical to carrying out project objectives. Neverthe-
less, the Bank accepts the worsened outcome in the project
at hand as a necessary sacrifice to maintain its reputation
for enforcement.7 This trade-off looks very different from the
firm’s perspective. A multinational firm with investments in
the borrowing country may be counting on a World Bank
project to provide infrastructure that is essential to its busi-
ness—roads, public utilities, harbor improvements, and so
forth—and may object to suspending the funding because of
noncompliance with Bank policies related to displaced pop-
ulations or environmental damage. Although the firm has no
direct interest in the evaluation of such a project, its lobbying
may create additional incentives for the project manager to
inflate the evaluation to justify the high level of disbursement
and may provide political cover within the organization for
doing so.
Multinational firms based in the United States are well
placed to lobby the Bank to disburse funds because complying
with their preferences is the path of least resistance at each
stage in the chain of delegation. Lobbying typically begins
with contacting a sympathetic congressional office; studies of
lobbying disclosure data indicate that firms that lobby focus
2. Formerly the Operations Evaluation Department (OED), established
in 1973.
3. The burden of proof is on the project team, and if evidence of
results is weak, the IEG may rate the ICR as unsatisfactory and downgrade
the project outcome. Interview with Soniya Carvalho, IEG Lead Evalua-
tion Officer, December 18, 2014.
4. The IEG has a staff of about 100 evaluators with diverse fields of
expertise. Desk evaluations start with the loan documents and the ICR,
and each evaluation goes through three levels of review.
5. Interview with Soniya Carvalho, December 18, 2014.
6. The overall outcome variable includes three subvariables: (1) Effi-
cacy captures the degree to which the project objectives were achieved.
(2) Efficiency is a matter of “bang for the buck” (how well the money
disbursed corresponds to the achievement of objectives); delays in dis-
bursement; and attribution of the results to Bank lending. (3) Relevance is
an evaluation of project objectives and their consistency with the Bank’s
Country Assistance Strategy for the borrowing country. For example, a
project with high efficacy will receive a higher evaluation if it disburses
fully without delays, but a project with low efficacy will receive a higher
evaluation if it does not disburse fully.
7. This motivation may be instrumental, to save the Bank’s credibility
for future interactions (Stone 2002), or it may be intrinsic due to rational-
bureaucratic organizational culture (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) and sub-
stantive conviction (Woods 2006).
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on Congress, and when they lobby executive agencies, gen-
erally lobby Congress as well (Baumgartner and Leech 2001).
Similarly, recent formal work suggests that lobbying Congress
should be more effective than lobbying executive agencies
(Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013). The congressional of-
fice, likely without the member’s active involvement, routinely
passes on such requests to executive agencies (in this case, to
theUS Treasury), because that is what good constituent service
requires. From the congressman’s perspective, complying is
costless and not complying could be costly. Treasury, for its
part, likely takes a broader perspective on the costs and bene-
fits of intervening in the operations of international financial
institutions, but the cost of a bit more disbursement on one
project in the World Bank’s portfolio is likely to seem insig-
nificant compared to the possibility of losing a vote on an
appropriations bill, so the Treasury routinely complies with a
request from a congressional office. When the request arrives
at the Bank, likely in the form of an inquiry from the US ex-
ecutive director’s office, it again seems wiser to comply than to
object. The United States is the Bank’s leading shareholder,
and it does no one’s career any good to be involved in a con-
troversy with US officials. Lobbying is effective because the
chain of delegation ensures that there is no one holding the
door shut.
The mechanism of influence is more direct for Japanese
firms, which have direct access to the economic ministries
because they are subject to a high degree of state supervi-
sion. This is reflected in Japanese foreign aid and economic
diplomacy, which consistently focuses on promoting Japa-
nese firms’ interests. Japan exercises a high degree of influ-
ence within the Bank as the second-largest shareholder in
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD) and a leading contributor to the International De-
velopment Association (IDA). Japan worked aggressively
during the 1980s to increase its voting power and influence in
both the World Bank and the IMF to reflect its growing econ-
omy but was more successful in the Bank, where it was able
to credibly threaten to divert development aid from IDA to
its bilateral development aid program. As a result, Japanese
informal control over World Bank lending in subsequent
decades appears quite strong, compared to weak influence in
the IMF (Lipscy 2015, supplementary materials). Japan has a
weaker hand than the United States, but it plays it more sys-
tematically on behalf of its firms.
This argument proposes a mechanism of private influence
that is absent from state-centered accounts of the politics of
intergovernmental organizations, but the logic of the mech-
anism imposes scope conditions. The implication of this ar-
gument is that corporate influence should be maximized when
high-level political attention is absent, so the final stages of the
Bank funding cycle are the most promising areas to identify
such effects. The politics of project approval have high stakes
for recipient countries and for the Bank’s principals because
the aggregate amount of Bank loans is large, so loan approval
should be marked by geopolitical influences rather than cor-
porate influence (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009). In con-
trast, the implementation of individual projects hasmuch lower
stakes for member states. Meanwhile, firms have only weak
interests in the aggregate amounts of funding committed to
particular countries but have direct stakes in the disburse-
ment of particular project loans. Corporate influence should
be maximized in the project-by-project process of evaluation
and disbursement, and geopolitical influences should be rare.
This draws a contrast between the informal politics of the
World Bank and its sister institution, the International Mon-
etary Fund, because IMF lending does not provide oppor-
tunities for a similar differentiation between the politics of
lending and of implementation. The IMF typically has only
one program active in a particular country, so there are no
small-scale, differentiated projects that could be of lesser con-
cern to country authorities. Similarly, IMF disbursements are
not disaggregated in away that would create incentives for firms
to lobby on narrow grounds. Quantitative evidence about the
Fund indicates that a similar pattern obtains across all stages
of the project cycle, including lending decisions, design of con-
ditionality, and enforcement of conditionality: countries im-
portant to the leading shareholders, and particularly to the
United States, obtain larger loans with less stringent condi-
tions and are subject to less rigorous enforcement. Several
studies link IMF lending to UN voting patterns (see Barro and
Lee 2005; Oatley and Yackee 2004; Thacker 1999) or to the
exposure of US banks to particular countries (see Broz and
Hawes 2006; Copelovitch 2010; Stone 2011). The design of
conditionality is likewise affected by a range of variables that
capture US geopolitical interests, including UN voting pat-
terns, alliance portfolios, foreign aid, foreign trade, and US
bank exposure (Dreher and Vaubel 2004; Stone 2008, 2011).8
Finally, the implementation and enforcement of condition-
ality depends on the same measures of US geopolitical inter-
ests (Stone 2002, 2004, 2011).
The logic of our argument implies that the most favorable
conditions for corporate influence arise in the Bank, rather
than in the Fund, and in project evaluation and implemen-
tation, rather than in project approval or design (table 1). In
contrast to loan approval, the scope for broad foreign policy
8. The literature on the IMF is divided as to whether to interpret
correlations with US bank exposure as evidence of corporate interest (Broz
and Hawes 2006; Gould 2003) or of US geopolitical interest (Copelovitch
2010; Stone 2011).
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concerns to influence the process of evaluation and imple-
mentation of World Bank projects should be limited. Our
empirical results find no consistent evidence of such influ-
ences.
DATA
Our primary dependent variable is Disbursement, the pro-
portion of committed funds that are disbursed.9 Because
we regard World Bank project evaluations as potentially bi-
ased, the research design requires an independent measure of
project performance to determine when disbursements of
funds are unjustified and evaluations are inflated. Fortunately,
World Bank documentation provides a substantial amount
of detail beyond the headline evaluation grade. The unit of
analysis used throughout the paper is a World Bank project,
and project-level information has been coded from theWorld
Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results (ICR) reports
and IEG publications, which can be accessed via the Bank’s
website. A team of research assistants coded reports on 4,206
projects issued from October 1994 through September 2013,
with project approval years ranging from 1981 to 2012. The
length of the reports ranges from 20 to 200 pages. These re-
ports represent a rich depository of information about the
diversity of projects that the Bank supports, their specific ob-
jectives, and the Bank’s assessment of the implementation of
these objectives. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in
the article can be found in table 2. The data include many
more variables, some of which we have used for exploratory
data analysis, and others that could be used in future research
to study diverse questions regarding World Bank lending.
Several recent studies havemade use ofmeta-data drawn from
ICR reports by the Bank, including official project evaluations
(Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay 2013), but this study breaks
new ground by creating an independent assessment of the
underlying performance data, which allows us to draw con-
clusions about the Bank’s evaluation procedures.
Our approach to measuring evaluation inflation is to
compare the headline Outcome rating in the ICR to an index
of the underlying data from the ICR on which it is based. For
each project, each individual objective was scored according
to the Bank evaluation team’s assessment of the degree to
which project goals had been achieved. Each project objec-
tive was assigned a value from 0 to 4, where 0 represents no
progress (or deterioration) and 4 indicates that the objec-
tive was completely achieved (or overachieved).10 In some
cases, evaluating objectives was straightforward. For instance,
one goal in an education-related project was to “increase Pri-
mary School Enrollment in Calcutta (India) from 25% to
30%,” with the outcome that it was increased to 29%, leading
to a “performance rating” of 3. In other cases, quantitative
metrics of objective completion were unavailable, such as
when the stated goal was to “spread awareness of the im-
portance of polio vaccination in rural Punjab (Pakistan).” For
such cases, the discussion of the achieved outcome was read
carefully to determine success. “Marginal progress made,” for
instance, would be coded as 1, whereas “significant change
in awareness” would be coded as 3. The average of these
objective-level ratings is our overall project-level variable, Per-
formance.
An important limitation of the data, which will be a con-
cern for all subsequent work that uses World Bank evalua-
tions, is that the World Bank does not maintain consistent
evaluation procedures over time. The Bank seeks to contin-
uously improve its procedures and responds to the demands
of its principals in real time. As a result, the objectives of
lending programs change, the relative weights assigned to
them shift, and the information collected to assess project
implementation changes. This means that the most recent re-
ports are more informative than the older ones. Fortunately,
even the older reports are sufficiently rich that careful read-
ing makes it possible to compile comparable codings for our
variables, but different levels of detail lead to unavoidable
heterogeneity in ourmeasure of performance.We identify four
distinct formats of ICR reports, and all of our analyses use
fixed effects to control for these regimes.11
The World Bank’s official assessment of project outcomes,
Evaluation, is taken directly from the ICR Reports. This vari-
able is marked in the reports as one of six categories, which
Table 1. Theoretical Expectations
Lending Evaluation/Implementation
IMF Geopolitics Geopolitics
World Bank Geopolitics Corporate influence
9. About a fifth of the observations have disbursement rates greater
than 1. Project objectives are sometimes expanded mid-course, and the
official commitment amount is not always updated. This can lead to a very
high disbursement proportion (maximum of 1,113). Those cases were
restricted to 1 to prevent outliers from skewing the results, but the results
with the unrestricted range of the variable are stronger.
10. A “1” indicates that up to 1/3 of the objective was achieved, “2”
that between 1/3 and 2/3 of the objective was fulfilled, and “3” that more
than 2/3 of the goal was accomplished but less than 100%.
11. The most recent report types are associated with lower Evaluation
scores, higher Performance scores, and higher Disbursement ratios, which
is consistent with the Bank’s objectives in tightening up the evaluation
procedure to strengthen performance incentives. Section 1 of the appendix
discusses ICR reports and the coding of variables in more detail.
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we convert to a 1 to 6 ordinal scale.12 Figure 1 depicts the raw
relationship between Performance and Evaluation. The figure
plots the density of Performance for each level of Evaluation
and indicates that there is considerable variation in project
performance that is not captured by evaluations.
Our main independent variable of interest, involvement
of multinational corporations (MNCs), is measured in two
ways. Our first measure relies on the World Bank’s Con-
tract Awards Database. MNC Contractor is a project-level
dummy variable indicating whether a Fortune Global 500 firm
or one of its affiliates was directly involved in a World Bank
project. The World Bank provides information on contracts
signed after July 1, 2000.13 This data set includes 2,387 proj-
ects; ICR reports are available for 1,790 of these projects.
Using the Fortune Global 500 list and data on mergers and
acquisitions from SDC Platinum, wematched all World Bank
contractors that were either Fortune Global 500 firms or had
been acquired by or hadmerged with those firms. Specifically,
we focused on the subset of these that were headquartered in
the United States, France, Germany, Japan, and the United
Kingdom. For any project that had such a contractor, MNC
Contractor takes on a value of 1. In the sample of projects used
for the final regressions presented in this paper, almost 28%
involved at least one MNC contractor. We also construct var-
iables for MNC Contractors headquartered in the United
States (US MNC), Germany, Japan, France, and the United
Kingdom, and compare the results.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Statistic Mean Median SD Min Max
Disbursement proportion .895 .993 .188 .000 1.000
Evaluation 4.436 5 1.141 1 6
Performance 3.019 3.000 .806 .000 4.000
MNC contractor .277 0 .448 0 1
US MNC .106 0 .308 0 1
US Fortune 500 .444 .047 .860 .000 4.261
MNC management contractor .021 0 .142 0 1
US MNC management .008 0 .090 0 1
Polityt21 3.167 6 5.875 210 10
log (Populationt21) 17.040 16.884 1.968 10.701 21.024
log (GDP per capitat21) 7.950 7.965 .958 5.276 10.273
Control of corruption 2.414 2.333 .810 .000 5.000
Report type 4 .381 0 .486 0 1
Report type 3 .199 0 .399 0 1
Report type 2 .092 0 .289 0 1
Report type 1 .328 0 .469 0 1
IBRD .326 0 .469 0 1
IDA .528 0 .499 0 1
Approval year 1998 1998 6.144 1981 2012
Report year 2003 2004 5.433 1990 2013
Project size per capita 5.407 1.987 11.690 .004 193.688
Note. IBRD p International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; IDAp International Development Association; MNCp multinational corporation.
Figure 1. Performance and evaluation
12. The six categories with numerical ranking are highly satisfactory
(6), satisfactory (5), moderately satisfactory (4), moderately unsatisfactory
(3), unsatisfactory (2), and highly unsatisfactory (1).
13. The World Bank’s Contract Awards data can be accessed at http://
go.worldbank.org/GM7GBOVGS0.
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A second measure is a country-level measure of foreign
direct investment by Fortune Global 500 firms. We are the-
oretically interested in strategic investments by major multi-
national firms rather than in flows of FDI, per se, and we are
interested in the national origins of these firms. Consequently,
we extracted firm-level data on mergers and acquisitions ac-
tivity from SDC Platinum, which we merged with data from
the Fortune Global 500 list, expanded to include all firms that
fell into the top 500 during any year in the last two decades.
Because of extensive missing values for the value of transac-
tions, we use a count of transactions to construct our index.
For each of the five countries listed above, we calculate the
percentage of total Fortune Global 500 mergers and acqui-
sitions in each recipient country in the data set in each year
and use a five-year moving average of this variable in the
regressions. See table 2 for summary statistics.
MNC Contractor is a more direct measure of firms’ in-
terest in World Bank projects than Fortune 500 Investment
because it identifies a particular firm that is involved in a
particular project. Consequently, it allows us to draw stronger
conclusions about the motivations of the firms involved.
However, this specificity also limits the range of motivations
for foreign investors to exert influence to the direct pecuniary
interest of project contractors. Fortune 500 firms that invest
in developing countriesmay develop vested interests inWorld
Bank projects for a wide range of reasons that do not involve
performing contract work. Thus, the two measures of MNC
interest are complementary. MNC Contractor varies at the
project level, and Fortune 500 Investment varies at the country-
year level. The two are not highly correlated (the correlation
between US MNC and US Investment is r p 0.10), so they
allow independent tests of our hypotheses. For correlations
between the main variables of interest, see figure A5 in the
appendix (appendix and figs. A1–A8 available online).
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
We first estimate effects of MNC Contractors on disburse-
ments and then delve deeper into the proposed mechanisms.
First, we disaggregate MNC contractors by country of origin,
allowing us to assess the importance of access to decision
makers from particular countries. Second, we zero in on the
particular contractors that aremost likely to have incentives to
influence Bank policy, which are contractors with manage-
ment functions. Third, we analyze models of evaluation to
detect whether evaluations are biased on projects that involve
MNC contractors. Fourth, we use performance as our de-
pendent variable to evaluate the alternative explanation that
MNC contractors improve the outcomes of Bank projects.
Fifth, we turn to our alternative measure of MNC interest,
Fortune 500 Investment, to probe the robustness of our find-
ings and explore whether lobbying influence extends to firms
that are not involved as contractors but may benefit from
Bank projects in other ways. Throughout our analysis, we
estimateOLS regressionswithWorld Bank projects as the unit
of analysis, using country, year, and report-type fixed effects.
MNC contractors
Firms are hired on contracts by the recipient country, which
receives loan disbursements from the Bank, so firms that
seek to collect payment for their services have incentives to
lobby for disbursement to the recipient country. On the
other hand, controlling disbursements is the Bank’s primary
tool to incentivize compliance by borrowing countries, so
undermining this incentive scheme has far-reaching conse-
quences. The expectation is that MNC Contractor will in-
crease disbursement, while controlling for project perfor-
mance. Controlling for performance allows us to interpret
positive effects as disbursements that were not justified by
the implementation of program conditions or accomplish-
ment of project objectives. To motivate the analysis that
follows, table 3 divides the projects in our data along two
dimensions, performance and involvement of MNC con-
tractors, and compares the average disbursement rates in
each subset. Projects with MNC contractors have higher dis-
bursement, both among high- and low-performing projects;
these differences are statistically significant.
Table 4 presents regression results that allow us to in-
vestigate this pattern more rigorously. MNC Contractor is
significantly associated with higher disbursement rates, con-
trolling for project performance. Including both country and
year fixed effects rules out a number of alternative explana-
tions for our results based on spurious correlations and omit-
ted variables. The estimated marginal effect of an MNC con-
tractor is a 2.7% increase in the disbursement ratio—amodest
but significant effect that affects the bottom lines of the firms
involved. Project evaluations have a significant effect on dis-
bursements as well: increasing the evaluation by one grade,
for example, from moderately unsatisfactory to moderately
satisfactory, increases the disbursement ratio by 4.7%. It is
striking that the estimated effect of an MNC contractor is
more than half as great as a higher evaluation. The effects of
performance, however, are insignificant when we control for
Table 3. MNC Involvement, Performance, and Average
Disbursement
Performance Any MNC No MNC p-Value of Diff.
High .95 .92 .020
Low .89 .86 .026
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evaluations; it is the evaluations that are important for set-
ting incentives, rather than the underlying performance data.
Other control variables are significant in other specifications,
but lose significance when we add year, country, and report-
type fixed effects.
The second stage of our analysis disaggregates our results
by the firms’ countries of origin (table 4, cols. 2–6). This
allows us to explore whether the mechanism driving our
correlations is political influence, in which case firms from
various countries might be expected to be treated differently,
or whether, instead, the results are driven by some other
economic, technical or bureaucratic factor that is associated
with the contract bidding process. The results suggest a po-
litical interpretation. As expected, thefirms from the countries
with the most influence in the World Bank, the United States
and Japan, are associated with increased disbursements, while
those from France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are
not. The results are marginally significant (p p :09 for US
firms, p p :06 for Japanese firms) but substantively indis-
tinguishable from the effect for all MNCs.
We can dial up the power of our tests by using the fact that
theWorld Bank identifies each contract’s type, which tells us
Table 4. Project Disbursement and MNC Contractors
Any MNC
(1)
US
(2)
France
(3)
Germany
(4)
Japan
(5)
UK
(6)
Performance .012 .011 .011 .011 .011 .011
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Evaluation .047*** .047*** .047*** .047*** .047*** .047***
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
Any MNC .027**
(.011)
US MNC .026*
(.015)
France MNC .007
(.017)
Germany MNC 2.023
(.029)
Japan MNC .033*
(.017)
UK MNC 2.015
(.052)
Proj. size pc 2.0001 2.00002 .00001 .0001 .0001 .0001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Polityt21 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004 .004
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Corruption control .013 .014 .014 .015 .013 .014
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012) (.012)
Log(GDP pc)t21 2.015 2.015 2.016 2.018 2.021 2.016
(.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062) (.062)
Log(Population)t21 2.081 2.063 2.063 2.062 2.084 2.059
(.180) (.180) (.181) (.180) (.181) (.181)
IBRD 2.008 2.007 2.006 2.005 2.006 2.006
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014)
Report FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Country FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
N 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167 1,167
Adj. R2 .970 .970 .970 .970 .970 .970
Note. IBRD p International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; MNC p multinational corporation.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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which contractors are most likely to bear some residual re-
sponsibility for project completion. The World Bank’s Con-
tracts Database assigns a procurement type to each contract,
and we aggregate the types of contract involving residual re-
sponsibilities into a management category. Our expectation
is that the effects will be stronger, because firms have greater
financial interest in the disbursement schedule when they are
engaged as general contractors, while they may expect to be
fully paid regardless of the outcome of the project when their
responsibilities are more limited.
Table 5 summarizes the results. Each column contains
the main coefficient of interest from a separate regression,
as indicated by the column heading. The specifications are
the same as in the previous table, and complete results can
be found in the appendix (table A5; tables A1–A29 avail-
able online). Contractors with management responsibilities
are associated with disbursement rates that are 7.2% above
the average, a statistically significant effect that is two and
a half times the average effect of MNC contractors.14 The
stronger effect for management contractors suggests that
the mechanism driving the result is likely to be the influence
exerted by the firm. When we disaggregate the results by
country of origin, the effect for US firms is estimated to be
an even greater 10.1% increase in disbursement. The effects
for firms from other countries are insignificant. The diverse
treatment of firms from different countries suggests a prima
facie case for a political interpretation.
To probe more deeply into the proposed mechanism, we
now consider the Bank’s evaluations of individual projects as
the outcome of interest. If it is the case that pressure from
firms explains the higher than expected disbursement rates,
then we also expect to see more evaluation inflation in those
instances, because higher evaluations are needed to justify
the higher disbursements. We focus on contractors with
management responsibilities; the results for all contractors
are somewhat weaker.15 The main results are summarized
in table 6. The control variables are the same as in the Dis-
bursement models above; full results are in table A6.
One point on the Performance scale predicts more than
two-thirds of a point on the Evaluation scale. Because we
control for performance, we can interpret the other coef-
ficients as effects on evaluation inflation; that is, they capture
the degree to which a covariate is associated with excessively
positive evaluations that are unjustified by the underlying
data. MNC Management Contractor has a positive and sig-
nificant coefficient in the first model, indicating that evalu-
ation inflation is highest when an MNC is involved as a
contractor with management responsibilities.16 This result
is consistent with our interpretation of the disbursement
models, that multinational firms collude with Bank staff to
frustrate project monitoring. Results disaggregated by coun-
tries of origin also support this interpretation. The substan-
tive effect is stronger but less precisely estimated for US firms
(p p :06) and is stronger and significant for Japanese firms.
French andGerman firms are not significantly associatedwith
inflated evaluations, and the significant negative coefficient
for UK firms rejects the hypothesis of any positive association.
The pattern is consistent with our findings about disburse-
ment: leadingMNCs are associated with excess disbursements
and inflated evaluations, but the effect appears to be limited to
firms from the countries that are the Bank’s leading share-
holders.
Table 5. Project Disbursement and MNC Management Contractors
Any MNC US France Germany Japan UK
Coefficient on MNC variable .072** .101** .048 .026 .076 .090
(.030) (.045) (.052) (.075) (.085) (.122)
Note. Coefficients and standard errors in parentheses. Allmodels include country, year and report typefixed effects. The specifications are
the same as in table 4. Full results are in table A5.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
14. The appendix contains robustness checks to deal with the fact that
Disbursement Proportion is left-skewed (see fig. A3). Tables A12 and A13
present results using (simple) bootstrapped and country-clustered boot-
strapped errors, and table A14 presents results of fractional logit models.
15. Using MNC Contractor rather than Management Contractor in
models of Evaluation leads the main variable to lose significance at con-
ventional levels when including both country and year fixed effects.
However, the results are significant and comparable when including either
country or year fixed effects. All three sets of results can be found in tables
A17–A19.
16. Tables A20 and A21 replicate these results using ordered probit
models without fixed effects. The ordered probit models with fixed effects
do not converge.
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We now turn to models that use Performance as the de-
pendent variable in order to probe an alternative explanation
for our results, which is that MNC contractors—especially
management contractors—are associated with greater dis-
bursements and higher evaluations because they improve proj-
ect outcomes. Summarized results are reported in table 7,
where each column again presents the main coefficient of in-
terest from a separate regression; the specifications are the
same as those presented in table 6, and full results can be
found in table A7. Performance is the objective-by-objective
index of project completion that we compiled from ICRs.
If we found a positive association between Performance and
MNC Contractor, this would undermine our interpretation
that disbursements and evaluations are driven by political in-
fluence. However, the coefficient forMNCManagement Con-
tractor is negative and marginally significant (pp .05), which
rejects the hypothesis that the involvement of MNCs pro-
motes the implementation of World Bank projects. This re-
sult is consistent when using all MNC Contractors as well (see
table A22). When we disaggregate by firm country of origin,
the corresponding coefficients are negative but insignificant
for US and French firms, negative and significant for Japanese
and British firms, and insignificant for German firms. This
indicates that most of the downward pull on performance
exerted by MNCs comes from Japanese and British firms, but
none of the subsamples betrayed any evidence that MNCs are
associated with stronger performance.
Fortune 500 investment
We now explore the robustness and substantive scope of our
findings by employing a set of alternative independent vari-
ables to measure MNC interests derived from merger and
acquisition (M&A) activity by leading firms. The hypothesis
behind these measures is that firms that are not contractors
but that have investments in the borrowing country may
nevertheless benefit from Bank projects. Consequently, MNCs
may lobby for disbursement in order to increase the odds of
completion of projects that are beneficial to their businesses,
irrespective of human rights or environmental considerations
that might otherwise derail them. In order to capture this in-
centive, we calculate the shares ofM&A investments from each
of our five countries of origin that go to particular countries
over a moving five-year period. For example, US Fortune 500
is calculated as the number of mergers and acquisitions by
US Fortune Global 500 firms in the borrowing country di-
vided by the total number of foreign M&As by US Fortune
Global 500 firms.
The weakness of this measure, compared to MNC Con-
tractor, is that we do not know whether a particular firm has
an interest in a particular project. Thus, we employ an in-
Table 6. Project Evaluation and Management MNC Contractors
Any MNC US France Germany Japan UK
Coefficient on MNC variable .358** .448* .325 .296 .907** 21.716***
(.156) (.237) (.282) (.342) (.459) (.662)
Note. Each coefficient represents a different regression. Allmodels include country, year, and report fixed effects.MNCpmultinational
corporation. The specification for each regression is the same as themodels presented in table 4, with the following exception: Evaluation
is now the dependent variable. Full results can be found in table A6.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
Table 7. Project Performance and Management MNC Contractors
Any MNC US France Germany Japan UK
Coefficient on MNC manag. 2.272* 2.011 2.344 .027 21.103*** 21.552***
(.139) (.212) (.252) (.305) (.408) (.590)
Note. Each coefficient represents a different regression. The specification for each regression is the same as the models presented in
table 4, with the following exception: Performance is now the dependent variable. Full results can be found in the table A7. All models
include country, year, and report fixed effects.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
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teraction term that is designed to screen out investors that
are less likely to have interests in particular projects. We
expect large projects to be of interest to more firms andMNC
interest to be attenuated on average in large countries. Con-
sequently, the specifications include interaction terms between
our measures of investment by national firms and project
size per capita, and the interaction effects are expected to be
positive.
Table 8 presents summarized results from five models of
disbursement, using investment proportions for the United
States, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom,
respectively, to measure the intensity of firm interests. As
before, each column presents the main variables of interest
from a separate regression, and the investment country of
origin is indicated by the column headings. The specifications
are the same as those in the earlier disbursement models,
shown in table 4; full results can be found in table A8. As
table 8 indicates, investment by US multinational firms has
an effect that is significant and substantively strong. Specifi-
cally, the effect of the presence of multinational firms that is
one standard deviation above themean on a project of average
size is to increase disbursement by 7.1%. This is larger than the
effect of increasing performance by a standard deviation.17
Figure 2 plots the composite coefficient for US Investment,
taking into account the interaction with project size.18
The x-axis covers most of the range of project size per
capita in the data (only 42 observations are larger than $50 per
capita.) The shaded area represents the 95% confidence in-
terval. Projects larger than $1.30 per capita are associated
with a significant effect, which includes about two-thirds of
the projects in our data set.19 Holding other variables at their
means, a one-unit increase (i.e., 1 percentage point) in US
investment is estimated to increase disbursement by 10.1% for
a $15 per capita project.
The fact that we find similar results using different sam-
ples and different measures of MNC involvement is reas-
suring. Indeed, the low correlation between US Investment
and US MNC Contractor (r p 0:10) reflects the fact that
the two variables measure different concepts—the presence
of major US multinational firms in a particular country, as
opposed to the involvement of such a firm as a contractor
on a particular World Bank project. Nevertheless, the results
suggest that each captures an important dimension of MNC
influence over the World Bank. Furthermore, the fact that
all of these results are robust to including country and year
fixed effects rules out alternative interpretations of our re-
sults based on fixed country-specific characteristics or con-
temporaneous shocks.
Consider how these estimated effects relate to a substan-
tive example drawn from the data. The Yacyretá Hydroelec-
tric Project II was active in Argentina from 1992 to 2000 with
a total project commitment of $300 million. The Yacyretá
Dam is a joint venture between Argentina and Paraguay ne-
gotiated in 1973, and both the World Bank and the Inter-
American Development Bank provided funds for parts of the
project at various points. This particular World Bank project
was launched in 1992, and its focus was constructing the dam
Table 8. Disbursement and Fortune 500 Investment
US France Germany Japan UK
Investment .026 .028** .015 2.034* 2.002
(.016) (.013) (.016) (.020) (.014)
Investment # project size .005* .002 2.003 .009** .004
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.004) (.003)
Note. Each column presents the main coefficients of interest from a separate regression, and each column heading indicates the
country whose Fortune 500 investment is represented. The other variables are the same as those used in table 4 and full results are
in table A8. All models include country, year, and report-type fixed effects.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
17. The results are robust to including sectoral fixed effects (table A23).
18. Table A16 presents similar results using a standardized version of
Project size per capita.
19. Similar figures for French and Japanese Fortune Global 500 MNC
investment are in the appendix (figs. A6, A7). We do not emphasize them
because they are less impressive. The composite effect of French Investment is
much smaller, peaking at half the substantive size of the corresponding effect
ofUS Investment. Japanese Investment has a larger substantive effect but only
gains significance for projects larger than about $22 per capita, which con-
stitute fewer than 5% of the observations in our data.
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and financing programs for infrastructure relocation, popu-
lation resettlement and environmental impactmitigation. The
Bank evaluated the project’s outcome as “unsatisfactory,” yet
the financing for the project was fully disbursed.
The project was shadowed by ecological and human-rights
protests from the outset. The original construction plan called
for a height of 83 meters above sea level, but construction
was stopped at 76 meters to avoid displacing an additional
80,000 inhabitants. As a result, the facility achieved only 60%
of the originally planned generating capacity of 3200 MW.
The project was plagued by cost overruns and allegations of
corruption, which led former Argentine President Carlos
Menem to label it a “monument to corruption.” Officials of
the Entidad Binacional Yacyretá (EBY), which administers
the facility, were convicted of embezzlement and insider trad-
ing, and the EBY was charged with violations of human rights
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The ICR re-
port evaluated the project as unsatisfactory because it failed
to provide efficient supply of energy, to ameliorate environ-
mental and social impacts, or to reach the targeted level of net
present value and economic rate of return. The only target that
was fully achieved was increasing private capital participation
in EBY.
The dam’s conception, planning, design, and construction
were managed by MWH Global, which is a US Fortune
500 corporation. MWH involvement is not discussed in the
ICR report itself (and the project predates the available data
from the Contract Awards Database), but the company’s
website provides a summary of the Yacyretá Hydroelectric
Project that outlines its role. This appears to be a case in which
a project’s performance did not justify its high rate of dis-
bursement, but a prominent US multinational corporation
had a stake in the funds being fully disbursed. Our results
estimate that US MNCs that take on management contracts
increase disbursement by 10.1%. Furthermore, our estimates
attribute 12.8% of the disbursement for this project to the
influence of US multinational investment.
It is instructive to further investigate MWH Global in its
role as a contractor onWorld Bank projects. There are 13 such
projects in our data set beginning in 2000, as summarized in
table 9. MWH served as a general contractor, with a share
of the contract for each project ranging from $300,000 to
$8.9 million, on a portfolio of projects totaling $1.05 billion.
In sum, 11 of these 13 projects were fully disbursed or ex-
panded, for an average disbursement rate of 102%. However,
the evaluation of these projects was unimpressive, averaging
a moderately unsatisfactory 3.9 (on a 6-point scale). Even the
project with the worst performance, a water treatment project
in Lebanon that received the worst possible evaluation, was
fully disbursed. MWH earned a total of $31 million in con-
tracting fees from the World Bank for supervising this series
of unimpressive projects.
It is in the nature of lobbying that it is difficult to detect,
so we would be unlikely to find direct evidence that MWH
benefited from US government support in its interactions
with theWorld Bank. However, reforms enacted in the 1990s
ensured that lobbying leaves some traces. The Lobbying Dis-
closure Act of 1995, as amended, requires lobbyists to register
with the Federal government and to disclose their client lists.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act Database indicates that MWH
was a registered client of the Livingston Group from 2006
through 2008 and paid retainers of $170,000.20 The Living-
ston Group is a leading Republican lobbying firm headed by
Robert Livingston, a former House Appropriations Chair-
man,21 who has been quoted as saying, “There’s unlimited
business out there for us.”22 Its client list includes the coun-
tries of Libya, Egypt, and Azerbaijan, as well as numerous US
Fortune 500 firms. Congressman Livingston’s personal dis-
closures indicate that he contributed to numerous Republican
House and Senate campaigns, which might be considered to
be investments in his influence business. There is no way to
know whether the group specifically lobbied on behalf of
MWH contracts with the World Bank, but it is evident that
MWH regarded lobbying as part of its business strategy.
DISCRIMINATION AMONG ALTERNATIVE THEORIES
We conduct two additional tests in order to further narrow
the possible interpretations of our findings. First, we con-
Figure 2. Marginal effect of US investment on disbursement
20. Lobbying Disclosure Act Database, United States Senate. soprweb
.senate.gov/index.cfm?eventpselectfields.
21. Livingston resigned his House seat in 1999 after being selected as
Speaker elect because of concerns that his extramarital affair would compli-
cate the effort to impeach President Clinton.
22. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, “The Road to Riches Is Called K Street,” The
Washington Post, June 22, 2005.
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duct a simple placebo test to isolate the effects of strategic
investment decisions by major multinationals from the back-
ground conditions that promote FDI. If some unmeasured
variable that is associated both with FDI and with favorable
outcomes on World Bank projects accounts for our results,
it should be possible to replicate our findings by substitut-
ing aggregate FDI for our measures ofMNC involvement.We
do this using data for FDI flows and stocks and cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no effects. Results can be found in
the appendix (columns 1 and 4, respectively, in table A24). In
addition, we replicate our disbursement results using each
measure of MNC involvement and find that the main results
continue to hold when we add FDI flows and stocks as ad-
ditional controls (see table A24 for full results). This indicates
that it is the involvement of major MNCs per se, and not
simply FDI, that produces the effects we find.
Second, we seek to distinguish the mechanism of corpo-
rate influence from the mechanism of geopolitics. It could
be that the presence of US multinationals serves as a proxy
for broader US interests in recipient countries, and it might
be these interests rather than those of business that are find-
ing expression in World Bank lending (Gilpin 1975; Krasner
1978). If this is the case, other measures of US geopolitical
interests that are associated with IMF lending behavior should
have similar effects in the case of the Bank.
Geopolitical interests
Table 10 summarizes the estimated effects on disbursements
of five measures of US geopolitical interests. Each entry rep-
resents the main coefficient from a separate regression, and
the geopolitical variables are indicated by the column head-
ings. Full results are in the appendix (tables A10, A11). The
first row of models in table 10 includes only report-type fixed
effects, and the second row includes report, country, and
year fixed effects. The five geopolitical variables have been
found to be relevant in the literature, and are added one-at-a-
time to our baseline disbursement model.
The Executive Director and UNSC Membership dummy
variables indicate whether the project-recipient country held
a seat on the World Bank Executive Board or on the United
Nations Security Council, respectively, during the project
implementation period. The other three variables are specific
measures of US geopolitical interest in the project recipient.
We consider whether countries that receive higher levels
of (lagged) US aid are also more likely to receive larger dis-
bursement percentages on their projects from the Bank. We
also measure US interest in terms of the (lagged) UN Voting
affinity S-score between the United States and each project-
recipient country. Important UN Votes calculates the S-score
based only on those votes that the US State Department has
identified in its annual report to Congress to be important
to US foreign policy, whereas All UN Votes includes all votes
in the United Nations General Assembly.
The results provide little support for the influence of geo-
political variables.23 None of the variables has a significant
coefficient in the specifications without country and year fixed
effects. Only one of the 10 coefficients is significant, that of
All UN Votes in the specification with country and year fixed
Table 9. MWH Contracts
Country Title Start End Comm. Disb.% Eval. MWH
Cambodia Road rehabilitation 1999 2006 32.3 107% 4 1.3
Vietnam Mekong trans. and flood protection 2000 2011 87.9 100% 4 .3
China Sichuan urban environment 1999 2007 102.0 44% 4 4.1
China Liao river basin 2001 2008 100.0 92% 5 2.3
China Tongbai pumped storage 1999 2007 197.5 100% 5 .2
Yemen Urban water supply and sanitation 2002 2010 84.7 104% 4 8.9
China Tai basin urban environment 2004 2010 57.5 100% 3 .9
Brazil Fortaleza metropolitan transport 2001 2010 22.4 155% 4 2.0
Laos Agricultural development 2001 2008 13.1 123% 4 3.5
China Zhejiang urban environment 2004 2011 133.0 100% 5 3.8
Bulgaria Wetlands restoration 2002 2008 7.5 100% 5 .8
Lebanon Ba’albeck water and wastewater 2002 2012 43.5 101% 0 .6
China Hunan urban development 2004 2012 172.0 100% 4 2.5
Note. “Comm.” is the original Commitment amount in million USD. MWH is the million USD amount of the MWH contract.
23. Also see Kilby (2009, 2013). Kilby’s work is also discussed in section
3.1 of the appendix where we replicate our main models, controlling for his
US Friend variable.
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effects. In addition, the result is not robust,24 and UN voting
is not associated with inflated evaluations.25 When we include
all of the geopolitical factors and US Fortune 500 in the same
equation (table A26), the effect of US Fortune 500 invest-
ment is consistent, but none of the geopolitical variables are
significant.
We conclude from this exercise that the range of inter-
pretations of our results has considerably narrowed.Measures
of US interests other than multinational investments do not
seem to explain patterns of World Bank lending, so the effect
of multinational presence is unlikely to be a proxy for geo-
political interests. Rather, it represents the effects of political
activity that firms pursue on their own behalf. The results
support the interpretation that major MNCs collude with
governments in the developing world to circumvent the mon-
itoring of World Bank project performance and lobby on
behalf of loan disbursements that are unjustifiable in terms
of the achievement of project objectives.
CONCLUSIONS
The World Bank is different in important respects from its
sister institution, the IMF, which subjects the implementa-
tion ofWorld Bank projects to a different pattern of informal
governance. We present evidence that is consistent with a
pervasive pattern of lobbying by multinational corporations
to encourage the Bank to make disbursements that are not
justified by project performance. In contrast, we find no evi-
dence that the participation or presence of multinationals
improves the most objective measures of project outcomes.
MNCs do not appear to assist the Bank in promoting devel-
opment, but they appear to interfere with its evaluation and
enforcement efforts. The effect is to undermine the incentives
for borrowing countries to achieve project objectives and to
comply with World Bank environmental and human rights
mandates.
The evidence that we present is statistical—we do not
have a proverbial “smoking gun”—but we are able to use a
series of tests to refine our inferences about the mechanisms
that are generating the pattern we see and to reject alter-
native explanations. We start with a set of firms that have
incentives to lobby for the release of project funds, which
are contractors on those particular projects, and we show
that their presence is associated with extraordinary disburse-
ments. We then disaggregate these firms by country of origin,
and find that it is only the US and Japanese firms that dem-
onstrate this effect. This strongly suggests a political inter-
pretation. If not for the fact that US and Japanese firms enjoy
privileged access to their respective policy networks, why
should projects that employ those firms be treated preferen-
tially?
We further refine our hypotheses by focusing on contrac-
tors that take on management responsibilities, which theo-
retically have the strongest incentives to seek to influence dis-
bursements. As expected, the effect of management contractors
is substantially stronger than the effect of contractors that do
not have these responsibilities. This appears to indicate that
we have identified the correct mechanism. Again, only US
Table 10. Disbursement and Geopolitical Interests
US Aidt21 All UN Votest21 Imp. UN Votest21 UNSC ED
Geopolitical variable 2.024 .023 .006 .014 .013
(.083) (.024) (.014) (.012) (.015)
Fixed effects ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗
Geopolitical variable .075 .120** 2.001 2.003 2.001
(.096) (.049) (.019) (.013) (.017)
Fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Note. All 10 coefficients shown here represent the main coefficient of interest from a separate regression, where the column heading
indicates the geopolitical variable each model focuses on. The other variables are the same as those used in table 4, and full results
can be seen in tables A10 and A11, respectively. Finally, all models include report type fixed effects, while “Fixed effects” in the
latter set of results refers to country and year fixed effects.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
24. Table A25 presents results that include interactions with project
size. All UN Votes remains the only significant geopolitical factor, but as
figure A8 indicates, its effect is decreasing in project size and is insignif-
icant for most of the range of projects.
25. Regressions using the same range of geopolitical variables and
Evaluation as the dependent variable yield insignificant results, with the
sole exception of UNSC Membership, which is significant at the 10% level
in one specification. See table A27.
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and Japanese firms exhibit the effect, and the effects are sub-
stantially stronger than the corresponding effects for all con-
tractors. Another way to probe the mechanism is to test for
additional observable implications, and we do this by using
Evaluations as a dependent variable. The mechanism that we
propose indicates that unjustified disbursements should be
associated with inflated evaluations, and we find that MNC
contractors (and particularly those with management respon-
sibilities) are indeed associated with inflated evaluations. On
the other hand, an alternative explanation for our findings
is that MNC contractors improve project performance. We
find that this is not the case. All of these results are robust to
country and year fixed effects, which dispenses with alterna-
tive explanations based on fixed country-level characteristics
or contemporaneous shocks.
These analyses have focused on tightly identifying the
mechanism that drives our results, but our next set of results
expands their substantive interpretation. Our argument sug-
gests that not only contractors may be interested in World
Bank projects; a wide range of multinationals that do not
receive project funds may benefit from Bank projects that
affect their business strategies. These firms also have incen-
tives to lobby for disbursement, because disbursing the funds
makes progress on a particular project more likely, and they
do not internalize the Bank’s reasons for withholding dis-
bursement. We find that when countries receive larger shares
of investments from major MNCs, they receive more excess
disbursements. Again, this result holds only for investments
by US and Japanese firms, which strongly suggests that a
political mechanism is at work. To further narrow the possi-
ble interpretations of this result, we use aggregate FDI as a
placebo test, finding no significant effects. This indicates that
the effects that we attribute to MNC political activity are not
due to some other factor associated with variations in FDI,
and that the effect is due to the presence of large MNCs rather
than smaller investors.
Another alternative explanation for our findings is that
MNC investment proxies for other US interests, but we find
little evidence of geopolitical influences on disbursement or
project evaluation. We tested for a wide range of hypoth-
eses drawn from the literature, seeking evidence of effects of
proxies for US interests that previously have been shown to
affect IMF lending, conditionality, or enforcement of condi-
tionality, or World Bank lending. We found scant evidence to
support these hypotheses in the evaluation and disbursement
of World Bank projects. We attribute this striking difference
from the findings of previous studies to the special features
of World Bank projects, which, while very important in the
aggregate, tend to be small scale in particular cases. These
individual projects are not highly important in terms of in-
ternational politics, but they may be highly salient to partic-
ular firms.
These findings should not be interpreted to mean, how-
ever, that US informal influence is not considerable in the
patterns that we see. We find effects on project evaluation
and disbursement for investments by US and Japanese multi-
nationals, and little evidence of effects for investments by
multinationals from other countries. This suggests that the
powerful informal policy networks of the two leading share-
holders play a critical role in facilitating the influence of US
and Japanese multinationals. This is consistent with the asym-
metric pattern of influence enjoyed by international civil so-
ciety actors in the World Bank generally: US NGOs have
tremendous advantages over similar organizations based in
other countries. Furthermore, when it is possible to show that
such groups exert influence, it is usually because they have
successfully lobbied theUS government—the executive branch,
the legislative branch, or both—and the Treasury has de-
ployed its policy network to translate their political demands
into informal influence. In short, the World Bank’s major
shareholders are not unitary actors, and firms based in those
countries are able to capitalize on the informal influence of
their states.
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